What does the recently concluded CCP congress mean for Africa?
The growing affinity between China and Africa is by now no longer news. What’s rather novel is the changing nature of this relationship, especially amidst a fragmented global political climate in which many countries of the Global South — African nations particularly — continue to lean more toward China over the past two decades. Studies suggest that China now leads the West in popularity among African countries.
As such, political moments such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress deserve Africa’s attention— not the least because the congress sets the tone for China’s relations with the world, including the African continent, over the next 5 years. More so, a renewed CCP commitment toward Africa would elicit a reactionary Africa-strategy from the West – especially the United States, which is now attempting to revive its relations with the continent. African policymakers must be aware of these implications.
The October 2022 Beijing gathering is the 20 edition of the CCP congress, an event that happens every 5 years. At this year’s congress, President Xi Jinping spoke for about 2 hours, touching on several political and economic issues, including China’s Foreign Policy (its push for a new global political-economic order), Zero Covid, digital technology, Taiwan and Hong Kong, military and defence, and carbon emission plans.
What could these pursuits mean for Africa? Let’s take a quick look at 5 of them.
Africa is central to China’s Strive for Prominence in the Global Order.
Although nowhere in Xi Jinping’s speech was Africa mentioned, his emphasis on China “lead[ing] the reform of global governance and establish[ing] a new type of international relations” implies a staunch commitment to reshaping the current world order. Beijing’s approach to this is a continual establishment of its presence where the West has been absent; it has been more aggressively expansionist in recent years, so, of course, it wants friends wherever it can find them. This means further pursuance of its expansion in the global south, especially Africa, as a bedrock for its rise to challenge Western power dominance in the current global political economy.
Africa-wise, two key issues emerge from this framing. The first is that Xi will further pursue his economic expansion agenda in Africa. His election for the 3 term as secretary of the CCP, as well as a further consolidation of his title as ‘core leader’ of the party, gives him at least another 5 years to strengthen some of his trademark policies in Africa – one of which is the Belt and Road Initiative, which has seen not less than 47 Sub-Saharan African countries benefit from China’s infrastructure finance. Xi’s seemingly ‘pro-Africa’ ambition is considered the strongest since the Sino-African relationship began in the 1950s under Mao Zedong.
However, this relationship is changing. The recent slowdown in Chinese finance has stymied some of Africa’s largest infrastructure projects— including, for example, the Abuja-Kano and Port Harcourt-Maiduguri rail projects in Nigeria, which have remained stuck since the beginning of the year.
Recall that at the Belt and Road construction symposium in November last year, President Xi signalled that China was moving away from funding risky mega infrastructure projects in “dangerous places” and is rather prioritising “small and beautiful” ones. Beijing had also announced a USD20 billion cut in its finance for Africa. Similarly, earlier this year, the Chinese central bank issued a new directive on lending limits for overseas loan businesses, including a request to “comprehensively consider the assets and liabilities, and currency structure” of loan beneficiaries before embarking on any financial agreement.
These developments suggest that the Chinese government, as well as its private lenders (which, by the way, have continued to grow in number), are, in fact, becoming more risk-sensitive and commercially focused in African markets. Some analysts have argued that this situation could spur Africa’s largest markets to seek out alternative forms of funding in places like Europe (how much Europe can offer Africa is still in question and we cannot rule out other alternatives such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has increasingly forged ties with the continent). In contrast, other scholars insist that the decline in China’s loans does not necessarily undermine China’s ambition for the African continent.
Whichever way the pendulum swings, what is certain is that Africa will remain central to China’s global ambitions for the next one or two decades, as evident in the recently unveiled China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035. Moreover, the relationship will spur reactionary Western policies, situating African countries as the new battleground for a reinforced US-China competition — something experts have pointed out is beneficial for Africa as it forces each side (China and the U.S) to offer its best for the continent.
The second implication of Xi’s ‘global China’ framing is that, over the next 5 to 10 years, China will consolidate its economic relationship with Africa to seek diplomatic and political support from the continent as it pursues global multilateral reform. For instance, during the 8 Ministerial Conference of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Dakar in November 2021, China announced its full support for the AU’s bid to join the G20 membership and Uganda’s plans to host the high-level convening of the Non-Aligned Movement — a reflection of Beijing’s intent to challenge hegemony and strengthen multipolarity in global diplomacy.
‘Zero Covid’
While many countries of the world have gradually relaxed their approach to Covid19 management, China has maintained a stringent “Zero Covid” policy, which includes strict quarantine protocols for travellers, abrupt lockdowns, and tougher covid-testing and contact tracing. This approach has worsened economic outlook and everyday life in the country, exacerbating unemployment and stifling exports. But rather than loosening the policy, Xi’s CCP congress speech strengthens his grip on zero-Covid.
An already slow-growth Chinese economy toughened by Zero Covid could mean lesser import demands for African commodities — especially for countries like Angola, Mauritania, and the Republic of the Congo, where primary commodity exports to China constitute more than 20% of the GDP. African policymakers should also be concerned about the increasing politicisation of China’s Covid policies and what its surveillance intricacies might mean for Africans in China, as well as business exchanges more broadly.
Secondly, China’s zero covid policies, already leading to a massive shrink in its tourism sector, could further stifle migration relationships with the African continent, as travel in and out of China see a massive drop. There have also been concerns that the discriminatory treatment against Africans at the outset of the pandemic management in China’s Guangzhou region would further reduce an already decimating African population in the region.
Green Goals
Xi Jinping was clear about China’s aim to achieve a greener economic development but stated that the country would gradually work toward reaching its carbon emission target and achieving carbon neutrality. Beijing’s ambition to achieve low-carbon growth and lead a new green industrial revolution globally has never been in question, as noted in Xi’s commitment to “abandon[ing] development models that harm the environment” during last year’s World leaders Summit on Climate.
What’s rather subtle in Xi’s so-called green energy rhetoric is that he wants to take a cautious approach to net-zero by first maximising the low-hanging fruits of coal energy in the short-term, striking a balance between China’s long-term pursuit of green energy and its immediate energy needs. Speech analysts have noted that Xi’s mention of “low-carbon” transitions was moderated by his reiteration of a commitment to a gradual energy transition which does not preclude the use of coal.
But what does this mean for Africa? First, it is worth noting that much of China’s focus on green energy is driven by a domestic imperative to urgently tackle the damming air and water pollution, which has had severe economic implications for the country. But Beijing also intends to reduce its own reliance on less stable energy sources (e.g., Russia), accentuating its position as a global green-energy champion through investment in less risky regions like Sub-Saharan Africa.
Currently, China is the single largest investor in Africa’s power sector, and much of that investment has been in renewable energy. Today, Chinese investment in renewable energy on the African continent is estimated to have grown up to USD13 billion as of 2018. China’s extended commitment to net zero would undoubtedly see more green energy investment flow into the continent; what is left is for African leaders to ensure reciprocal benefits for both parties.
Technology
A quick scan of the full English text of Xi Jinping’s speech sees him mentioning the word “technology” 23 times— twice the mentions in his 2017 speech (12 times). The reason for this is not far-fetched: Xi wants to place China at the frontier of the global technology competition, although his speech seems to emphasise China’s wider science and technology ambitions rather than the much-contested arena of information technology which has received the most attention lately.
Xi also repeatedly stressed achieving “self-reliance” and “strength” in China’s science and technology pursuits— two words that significantly allude to its shift towards technological nationalism amidst a deepening tech war with the U.S. Within this, Beijing looks to prioritise its self-sustenance in the semiconductor industry, especially as the US continually deploys sanctions and export bans on Chinese technologies, mostly crippling its leading tech company, Huawei’s access to chips necessary for its production. Lately, America has also been pushing for its partners to abandon Chinese technologies like Huawei (it’s unclear how much of this will affect Africa, which currently constitutes only a small fraction of Huawei’s revenue source)
In relation to Africa, we can draw three quick insights from Xi’s speech.
First, a move towards more domestic semiconductor manufacturing would increase China’s demand for African mineral resources that are required in the semiconductor production process. This would unlock a new level of resource dependence on Africa. Already, DRC, an African country, is home to one of the world’s largest sources of columbite-tantalite (Coltan) — a rare mineral used in semiconductor production. China’s exploration of this mineral has fueled decades of conflicts and human right abuses in the country.
Secondly, we should expect an even deeper digital tech relation with Africa as Beijing strives to retain its imprint in the African market. Already, through its Digital Silk Road initiative introduced in 2015, China remains the largest financer of digital infrastructure in Africa, including supporting 5G launch, digital I.D systems, AI infrastructure and data centres in many African countries.
China also currently holds the largest share of the mobile phone market in Africa, 3 times more than the share of U.S owned brands. Tellingly, a growing US-China tech rivalry would significantly affect the digital ecosystem in Africa, especially the demand for Chinese mobile phones— unless China can accelerate its semiconductor sufficiency to match exploding demands for its brands in African countries.
Thirdly, while the world remains fixated on China’s telecommunications relationship with Africa, Xi wants to foster an expansion of China’s influence into “strategic emerging industries” and new technology arenas. At the moment, Chinese companies are silently expanding their investment into several other technology domains in Africa, including financial technology, AI and speech recognition, and a massive expansion into biotechnology. China’s diversification of its technology presence in Africa will put it at the forefront of all things tech on the continent over the next few years.
Taiwan
Africa might be less crucial in China’s current move to reunite with Taiwan, but it is certainly not irrelevant. At this year’s congress, President Xi noted China’s intention to pursue “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, although he does not rule out the use of force.
Traditionally in international diplomacy, countries only maintain diplomatic ties with either China or Taiwan, not both. During the early 1960s, when China’s relations with Africa was still in its infancy, Taiwan enjoyed favourable diplomatic ties with the continent, being recognised by 13 out of 23 African countries in the UN at the time, compared to only 5 China supporters. However, by 1971, when the UN voted to recognise the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan’s African supporters had dropped to 20, with China increasing to 22.
Fast-forward to today, despite increasing its overseas investment and loans to Africa, Taiwan’s support from African countries has diminished to near zero (with Eswatini being virtually the only African state that recognises Taiwanese independence in international diplomacy).
Recently, we have also seen a trend of African countries abandoning their support for Taiwan to seek ties with China; Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe in 2016, and Burkina Faso in 2018. In fact, in countries where Taiwan still maintains some form of economic or trade ties, an increasing relationship with China has threatened to obliterate what is left of those ties; for instance, in 2017, having received a USD40 billion in finance from China, Nigeria ordered Taiwan to relocate its trade mission from Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, to Lagos — seemingly a strategy to push Taiwan’s presence in Nigeria to oblivion.
More remains to be seen on how Beijing’s renewed pushback against Taiwan could further decimate Africa’s relationship with the island country.
The upshot of all this is that Xi Jinping’s continuance as the leader of China over the next 10 to 15 years, as experts predict, would further strengthen China’s ties with Africa. Importantly, African states must position themselves to derive mutual benefits from this relationship and not negotiate themselves into disadvantageous terms.